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COMMENT
Russian and Polish Anti-Monopoly Legislation:
Laws for Two Markets Compared
I. Introduction
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are presently in a
period of restructuring. More particularly, Poland and Russia are in
different stages of transition from a centralized, state economy to a
market economy. Because the former command systems focused on
concentrated and centralized production, many enterprises now oc-
cupy a dominant position in their respective markets. In order to
remedy this imbalance and to move towards a decentralized market
system, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Sejm
of Poland have recently enacted legislation designed to limit monop-
olistic activity.' Both laws establish powerful administrative agencies
to act as anti-monopoly boards 2 and to play a major part of the
1 0 konkurentsii i ogranichenii monopolisticheskoi deyatel'nosti na tavarnoykh roynkakh [On
Competition and Restricting Monopolistic Activity on the Commodities Markets],
Vedomosti RSFSR, Mar. 22, 1991, Item 499, at 410 reprinted in Ekon. i Zh. (No. 19), May
25, 1991, at 24 [hereinafter On Competition]. Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices,
DZIENNIK USTOW (No. 14), Feb. 24, 1990, translated in U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.3 (1990)
[hereinafter On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices]. It was initially unclear whether the Rus-
sian law is in force, RUSSELL PFFMAN, SOME CRITICAL PROVISIONS IN THE ANTI-MONOPOLY
LAWS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 3 (Economic Analysis Group - Discussion Paper
91-10) (Sept. 10, 1991) [hereinafter PrrrMAN], but the Anti-Monopoly Committee has
been active for some time. See, e.g., V. Belikov, A Black List of Monopolists Has Been Compiled
in Moscow, Izvestiia, 1992, at 2, translated in SOVDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Feb. 12,
1992. The Polish law became effective 30 days after its publication. PITTMAN, supra at 3.
Both laws were written with extensive consultation from the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Dept. ofJustice. Michael Murphy, The Russian Anti-Monopoly Law, S.E.E.L., Sept. 1991, at
10.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed anti-monopoly legislation later in 1991. Ob
ogranichenii monopolisticheskoi deyatel'nosti v SSSR [On Restricting Monopolistic Activity in the
USSR], Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, reprinted in Izvestiia [IzVESTIIA], July 25,
1991, translated in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 28, 1991, at 15. This law
differed from the Russian law only in that the Russian Anti-Monopoly Committee had the
ability to break up concerns held to be in violation of the law. On Competition, supra art.
19. In November, 1991, however, the USSR Anti-Monopoly Committee was liquidated,
and in January, 1992, the Union as a whole ceased to exist. Abolition of Union Ministries
Agreed (Russia's Radio 2100 gmt 4 broadcast, Nov. 6, 1991), translated in BBC - SUMMARY
OF WORLD EVENTS, Nov. 6, 1991, at SU/1222/Cl/l.
2 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 3; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, art. 17. Hereinafter, these administrative agencies will be referred to collectively as
the anti-monopoly boards. The Russian Committee is also empowered to license com-
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scheme to transform the subject economies into free-market, less
centrally controlled entities.3 In order to understand the role of
these two laws, it serves to examine the economic situation of both
countries.
Many commentators have noted that efficient markets can be
created in Eastern Europe only through a combination of four
mechanisms: (1) privatization; (2) elimination of the command econ-
omy including price controls; (3) de-monopolization; and (4) trade
liberalization. 4 These four approaches compliment each other by
empowering private business and by encouraging individual initia-
tive; yet, the order and pace in which these reforms are implemented
for different sectors of the economy are the subject of much debate.
Some argue that state monopolies must be privatized and broken
apart before prices are lifted.5 Others contend that trade liberaliza-
tion creates effective competition within the transforming state and
modities exchanges. See Tyumen Exchange Plans Selling Oil Fields, IZVESTIIA, Aug. 3, 1991, at
2, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Aug. 3, 1991; M. Berger, Exchanges: Law and Activity,
IZVESTIIA, July 29, 1991, at 2, translated in SoVDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, July 30,
1991; Captain V. Urban, Make Room, Monopolist!, Krasnaya Zvezda, July 11, 1991, at 1,
translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, July, 11, 1991.
The Russian Anti-Monopoly Committee was originally under the jurisdiction of the
government (executive), which meant that President Yeltsin appointed its chair and di-
rected policy. The Supreme Soviet (legislature) attempted to wrestle away control of the
Committee by bringing it within its jurisdiction. Mikhail Karpov, Yeltsin's New Move,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1992, at 2, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, May 16, 1992. In an
exceptional resolution of a separation of powers question (unfortunately beyond the scope
of this Comment), the Russian Constitutional Court upheld an appeal by President Yeltsin
to bring the Committee back to the government. Lyudmila Yermakova, Yeltsin Scores Victory
in Constitutional Court, TASS, May 20, 1992, translated in BBC - SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAD-
CASTS, May 22, 1992, at SU/1387/B/I.
s Russia's President Is Ready For Radical Reforms, Nezavisimaya Gazet (No. 126), at 1
(1991), translated in SoVDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Oct. 15, 1991; Michael Murphy,
The Russian Anti-Monopoly Law, S.E.E.L., Sept. 1991, at 10-11. Lyudmila Alexandrovna,
Rustoy Citicizes Russian Government, TASS, Dec. 14, 1991; S. Nikitin, For Businessmen of Rus-
sia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (No. 227-228), at 7 (1991), translated in SoVDATA DIALINE -
BIZEKON NEWS, Oct. 31, 1991; 3 POSTFACTUM, Russia 's President Is Ready For Radical Reforms,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (No. 126), at 1 (1991), translated in SOvDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON
NEWS, Oct. 15, 1991; Business Alliances, Mergers Regulated Under Anti-monopoly Law, SOVIET
BUSINESS LAW REPORT, Oct. 4, 1991. But see A. Uglanov, Another Monopoly Monster, Argu-
menty i Facty (No. 38), at 1 (1991), translated in Soviet Press Digest, Sept. 30, 1991.
For general background discussion of the Polish program, see Anti-Monopoly Office,
BUSINESS NEWS FROM POLAND, Aug. 31, 1990; Memorandum for Development Policy, BUSINESS
NEWS FROM POLAND, Aug. 31, 1990.
4 James Langefeld & Marsha W. Blitzer, Is Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and
East Europe Need?, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 350 (1991) [hereinafter Langefeld &
Blitzer]; see also THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INC., BUILDING FREE MARKET
ECONOMIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND REALITIES (1990); MANUEL
HINDS, ISSUES IN THE INTRODUCTION OF MARKET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST
ECONOMIES (1990).
5 Langefeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 352; Prices Up Sharply in Czechoslovakia, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at A5. Contra, HEIDI KROLL, REFORM AND MONOPOLY IN THE SOVIET
ECONOMY 36 (Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development Briefing Paper
No. 4) (1990) [hereinafter KROLL]; Ye. Shestakov, How to Defeat Monopolies, Nedelya (No.
11), at 6 (1992), translated in SovDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Mar. 20, 1992.
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acts to temper the rent-seeking behavior of monopolies.6 In this re-
gard, Russia and Poland have taken rather different approaches.
A. Changes in the Russian Economy
The former Soviet command economy, in which all economic
decisions concerning allocation were made by government minis-
tries,7 has undergone major change in the last five to seven years.
Since 1985, enterprises have acquired increasing authority to control
their own destinies." Industry has become more highly centralized
and firms now tend to be more affiliated with like entities, suppliers
and consumers than even their counterparts in most Western coun-
tries.9 For example, one industrial ball-bearing plant now serves
ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of the domestic market.' 0
Other highly centralized industries include those related to hard-
ware, construction technology, passenger cars and semi-
conductors. "
There are many stated causes for the presence of industrial mo-
nopolies: the command economy,' 2 the ideological suppression of
6 See Jeffrey Sachs, Sachs on Poland, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1991, at 61; Head of Anti-
Monopoly Agency on Competition, Rzeczpospolita (No. 48), Feb. 26, 1992, at 1, translated in
POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Feb. 26, 1992. Contra, Langefeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 359-
60.
The order in which these changes are implemented in any sector of the economy may
depend upon the nature of the sector, the progress of reform and the economies of scale.
In a recent interview, Yuri Gaidar, the acting Russian Prime Minister and chief architect of
economic reforms, reflected that in the current Russian approach:
[t]here are spheres and areas where our enterprises will be up against stiff
competition from imported goods, foreign partners or rivals. Where foreign
economic competition is a reality, we should not blindly believe into the anti-
monopoly dogma and destroy our sensible integrated structures just in order
to make the economy flat as a table top. It is another question that we will
need a strengthening of our anti-monopoly policy in those areas where do-
mestic competition is badly needed and external competition will be long in
coming. Say, organization of trade, demonopolization of existing structures.
Interview with Yuri Gaidar, Acting Prime Minister of Russia (Russia television network
broadcast, July 13, 1992), translated in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 15, 1992.
7 DAVID DYKER, RESTRUCTURING THE SOVIET ECONOMY 181 (1992); Alexei Klishin,
Economic Reform and Contract Law in the USSR, 28 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 253 (1990) [herein-
after Klishin]. See also Peter Havlik, G6rbachev's 'Reform Course Confirmed, in ECONOMIC RE-
FORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION 89-99 (Hubert Gabrisch ed., 1989).
8 See 0 gosudarstvennom predpriiatii (ob"edinenii) [On the State Enterprise (Associa-
tion)], IZVESTIIA, July 1, 1987, at 1, translated in 39 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS
(Nos. 30-31) at 8 (1987). See also Klishin, supra note 7.
9 KROLL, supra note 5, at 3-4. Some estimate that 20,000 to 30,000 Soviet enter-
prises should be considered "monopolistic." Dmitri Maximov, Russia's Anti-monopoly Com-
mittee: A Monopoly on Fighting Monopoly, KOMMERSANT (No. 12), at 5 (1991), translated in
SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Mar. 25, 1991.
10 KROLL, supra note 5, at 5-6.
II Id. at 5, 8.
12 Enterprises were not allowed to "shop" for quality goods, thus inefficient suppliers
of low quality goods were not allowed to die off, as they would in a capitalist market. Id. at
22-24.
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small-scale enterprises,13 'the absence of standardization,' 4 "gigan-
tisism,"' 5 "perpetual" demand,' 6 and the industrial mergers of the
Brezhnev years.' 7 Yet, regardless of the cause, the presence of mo-
nopolies threatens the contemporary Russian economy by their abil-
ity to increase prices, target demand or otherwise seek economic
rents at the ultimate expense of consumers.' 8 Unnecessary price in-
creases now touch a particularly sensitive nerve in the ex-Soviet
economy because inflation threatens to become one of the more de-
stabilizing forces in the country.' 9 For these reasons it has been
noted that:
[Tihere is only one way to introduce meaningful competition into
the Soviet economy, and that is by introducing a real market. A rig-
orous antitrust policy, including the breakup of monopolies and
strict control of mergers and cartels, could prove effective in pro-
moting competition, but only in conjunction with macroeconomic
stabilization and the introduction of a market.
20
B. Poland's Economic Transformation
Like the former U.S.S.R., Poland directed the economy through
administrative bodies and was inclined to create a centralized pro-
duction. Scarcity problems, similar to those faced by Soviet enter-
prises, caused Polish industry to become largely vertically
integrated. 2' It is estimated that monopolists now produce seventy
'3 Id. at 1.
14 If parts were easily interchangeable, enterprises could change suppliers without
much effort. The fact that few industries are standardized explains the extent of vertical
integration. Id. at 10-12.
15 For a long while, the Soviets equated size with efficiency, even though efficiency is
a product/firm specific concept. Id. at 16-17.
16 Id. at 22-23.
17 Id. at 17-20, 38-46. See generally Eleanor M. Fox &Janusz A. Ordover, Free Enter-
prise and Competition Policy for Central and East Europe and the Soviet Union (Oct.
1991) (unpublished paper, International Bar Association) [hereinafter Fox & Ordover].
18 KROLL, supra note 5, at 1; A. Stepovoi & S. Chugayev, Does the Market Need a Monop-
oly?, IZVESTIIA, July 4, 1991, at 3, translated in 43 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS pt.
27, at 13 (1991); I. Demchenko, A Monopolist Against Monopolism, IZVESTHIA, Aug. 10, 1990,
at 10, translated in 42 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS pt. 32, at 22 (1990); V. Pashin,
The State Committee for Prices Has Let a Vicious Genie Out of a Bottle, SOVETSKAYA BASHKIRIA,
Nov. 17, 1991, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Nov. 17, 1991; V. Romanyuk, Against
Monopolism, IZVESTIIA, Aug. 30, 1990, at 1, translated in 42 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS pt. 35, at 32 (1990); S. Boligolovsky, Monopoly Will Cost I Million Rubles in Russia,
KOMMERSANT, § 6 at 10, translated in SovDATA DIALINE - BIZEKON NEWS, Feb. 12, 1991.
19 M. Zakharov, Russia ' MPs Speak Out, VODNY TRANSPORT, 1991 (No. 124), at 2, trans-
lated in SOVDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Oct. 31, 1991; Tatyana Akkuratova, Statisticians
Confirm Fears About Russian Economy, TASS, Oct. 25, 1991; What Awaits Us From Now Until
Year s End, IZVESTIIA, July 24, 1991, at 2, translated in 43 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PRESS pt. 30, at 11 (1991); Jan Winiecki, The Inevitability of a Fall in Output in the Early Stages
of Transition to the Market: Theoretical Underpinnings, 43 SOVIET STUD. 669 (1991).
20 KROLL, supra note 5, at 71. See Russia 's Anti-Monopoly Programme in the Works, TASS,
Sept. 14, 1991.
21 Jeffrey Sachs & David Lipton, Poland's Economic Reform, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 47, at 49-
52 (Summer 1990) [hereinafter Sachs & Lipton]; Langefeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 363;
Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 3.
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percent of the goods of the Polish economy and represent one quar-
ter of its total number of enterprises. 22 Nevertheless, Poland has ad-
vanced further towards reform than Russia, particularly with regard
to anti-monopoly enforcement. 23 Consequently, the Polish experi-
ence provides an indication as to the problems the Russian govern-
ment may face. 24
Prior to 1990, distortions in the pricing systems of Poland ex-
isted for three main reasons: (1) monopolies; (2) subsidies; and (3)
import distortion.2 5 Poland's "shock therapy," beginning January 1,
1990, did much to alleviate the distortions created by the latter two
factors,26 although monopolies maintain the ability to distort sub-
stantially the Polish economy. 27 Poland's macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion efforts included fiscal austerity, phasing out of price controls
and subsidies, and beginning the process of privatization.28 Poland's
pre-1990 reforms, along with the shock program of 1990, have re-
lieved much of the inflationary pressure in part by indexing wages at
a rate below the inflation rate and by tightening credit.29 Although
few Poles can afford them, goods that were once rare have reap-
peared on store shelves.30 Structurally, the Polish economy has be-
come more decentralized than its Russian counterpart, especially in
the area of agriculture3 ' and the most monopolistic structures re-
maining in the economy are distribution systems.3 2
This Comment compares the Russian and Polish anti-monopoly
laws in order to identify their weaknesses and to determine how each
22 Grzegorz Gorny, Interview with Anna Fornalczyk, President of the Anti-Monopoly Office;
We Are Learning Our Alphabet, GAZETA INT'L, June 28, 1990; Grzegorz Cydejko, Anti-Monop-
oly Office, WARSAW VOICE, Jan. 20, 1991.
23 Langefeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 377-79.
24 Stanislaw Wellisz, The Lessons of Economic Reform: The Polish Case, 45J. INT'L AFF. 165
(1991) [hereinafter Wellisz]; Grzegorz Cydejko, Anti-Monopoly Office, WARSAW VOICE, Jan.
20, 1991.
25 Paul Hare & Gordon Hughes, Competitiveness and Industrial Restructuring in Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Poland, Center for Economic Policy Research: DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES No.
543, 38-40 (1991) [hereinafter Hare & Hughes]. See Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 33.
26 Sachs & Lipton, supra note 21, at 47, 54-56.
27 Hare & Hughes, supra note 25, at 40-41; Sachs & Lipton, supra note 21, at 53.
28 Sachs & Lipton, supra note 21, at 53. By mid-1991, 500 of Poland's estimated 7,800
public enterprises had undergone the process of transformation. Marek Kulczycki, Trade
and Business Opportunities in Poland, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 366 (1991). For a general
discussion of the legal mechanics of the Polish privatization program, see Sachs & Lipton,
supra note 21, at 55. Bogdan Mroz, Poland's Economy in Transition to Private Oumership, 43
SOVIET STUD. 677 (1991).
29 Sachs & Lipton, supra note 21, at 54-56. Marek Kulczycki, Trade and Business Oppor-
tunities in Poland, 24 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363 (1991). See Wellisz, supra note 24, at 168-
175.
30 Wellisz, supra note 24, at 174.
31 Bogdan Mroz, Poland's Economy in Transition to Private Ownership, 43 SOVIET STUD.
677 (1991).
32 Ironically, the agricultural distribution system is regarded as highly monopolistic.
Grzegorz Gorny, Interview with Anna Fornalzyk, President of the Anti-Monopoly Office; We Are
Learning Our Alphabet, GAZETA INT'L, June 28, 1990.
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may aid in the reform process. Different aspects of the countries'
laws are compared, including their relative spheres of application,
the types of monopolistic or collusive activity they regulate, the gen-
eral exemptions from the laws and the scope of remedies that each of
the anti-monopoly boards may seek. Each law has potential to help
competition and consumers in Russia and Poland, but much still de-
pends on the political support and willpower that each receive in
enforcement.
II. A Comparison of the Russian and Polish Anti-Monopoly Laws
A. Relative Spheres of Application - The Who and the What
1. Scope of Application
The first articles of both the Russian and the Polish laws define
the basic terms of each and its scope of application. 33 The Russian
law applies to all "relations in which economic subjects and bodies of
power and administration, and individual public servants take part in
the activity on the republican (RSFSR) and local commodities mar-
ket" on the territory of the Russian Federation. 34 The local com-
modities market is considered to include "[t]he sphere of commodity
turnover within the boundaries of a republic, entering into the com-
position of the RSFSR, autonomous regions [oblast'], autonomous
territories [krai], regions, [and] territories."'3 5 The Russian law also
includes in the definition of economic actors any juridical person tak-
ing part in these groups 36 so that informal associations are covered
even when they do not contain a governmental element. 37 Finally,
the law on competition confers on the government jurisdiction over
foreign actors whose actions restrict competition within Russia. 38
The Polish law, on the other hand, covers all "arrangements"
and practices of "economic subjects." 39 An "arrangement" includes
"[c]ontracts," "[a]greements," and "[r]esolutions or other acts
passed by the unions of economic subjects." '40 Thus, the law appar-
ently applies to trade associations and to agreements which are not
legally enforceable. However, the head of the Anti-Monopoly Office
recently took the position that the actions of trade associations, such
as an association of steelworks directors, are not "economic sub-
33 On Competition, supra note 1, arts. 2, 4. On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note I, arts. I, 2.
34 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 1(1). The Law consistently refers to the RSFSR
(Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic). Since the adoption of the Law, the official
name of the country has changed to the Russian Federation. See Burger, Yeltsin's Plan for
Name Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1992, at 4.
35 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 4.
36 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 4.
37 See discussion of exemptions, infra Part II.C.
38 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 2.
39 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note I, arts. 2(3), 2(1).
40 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 2(3).
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jects," and thus are not subject to the pro-competitive regulations. 41
Several differences are apparent. Significantly, economic sub-
jects under Polish law do not include governmental agencies, as does
the Russian law. It is presumed that Polish agencies will cooperate
with the Anti-Monopoly Office, while the Russian law anticipates
some animosity between government bodies. Given that interaction
between Soviet concerns and given that conglomerates and associa-
tions grew and specialized government ministries developed
throughout the 1970s, this inclusion is appropriate. 42
The second significant difference between the Russian and Po-
lish provisions is that the Polish law does not precisely define what
constitutes commodity markets. The text of the law occasionally dis-
tinguishes between the "home" and "local" markets without defini-
tion.43 The Polish Anti-Monopoly Office is expected to define the
relative market. Thus, it is possible that the body could corner an
enterprise by narrowing the market delineation in order to inflate
the relative market share. The Russian law specifically defines mar-
kets according to the boundaries of governmental subdivisions.
Given the size and federal nature of Russia, these divisions are ap-
propriate. While the law on competition could be difficult to apply
to particularly large regions or territories, such as the Yakut Autono-
mous Region, this problem is somewhat self-correcting since these
regions usually have significantly smaller populations and
economies.
2. "Dominant Market Position" and "Monopolistic Position"
The Russian law reflects a more laissez-faire approach to the
definition of dominant market position. The Russian law considers
firms with the ability to limit freedom of activity of other enterprises
and firms with a level of market activity which "makes access to the
market difficult for economic actors" to be in dominant market posi-
tions.44 The Anti-Monopoly Committee cannot consider a firm in
dominant market position unless it has a market share of more than
thirty-five percent.45
The Polish law states that firms which do "not encounter sub-
stantial competition on the home or local market" are in a dominant
market position.46 Additionally, it only creates a presumption that
41 NIK Detects Steel Cartel, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Nov. 14, 1991, at 5, translated in PoLIsH
NEWS BULLETIN, Nov. 14, 1991.
42 KROLL, supra note 5, at 17-20, 38-46.
43 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, arts. 2(6)-2(7). Other provisions
merely refer to "the market." Id. arts. 4(1)(4), 4(2)(1), 5, 11 & 12(4). Still others refer to
"market share." Id. arts. 2(7) & 7(2).
44 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 4.
45 Id.
46 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 2(7).
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firms with a market share of thirty percent are so classified. 47 Thus,
the Polish Anti-Monopoly Office may specifically find that firms with
smaller market shares are in dominant position. The percentage of
the market, of course, depends upon the definition of the market
under consideration - a demarcation which is left undefined by the
Polish statute. The Polish law differs substantially from the Russian
statute in that it further distinguishes enterprises in a "monopolistic
position" from those merely occupying a dominant position.48 An
economic subject is in a monopolistic position if it "does not en-
counter any competition on the home or local market." 49
The definitions of "dominant" and "monopolistic" market posi-
tions in the Polish law are troublesome. 50 Economic actors offering
a new product into the Polish market are effectively "punished" by
the heightened scrutiny accompanying such classifications. 5 1 The
approach of the Russian law is more logical because it defines one as
in the dominant position only when there is an adverse affect on
competition. This narrower classification may serve as a buffer from
inefficient application of the law and preserves the statute's stated
goal of addressing barriers to market entry facing private business.
B. Types of Regulated Monopolistic or Collusive Activity52
The Russian and Polish competition laws regulate four sets of
economic actors: (1) single entities; (2) groups acting in concert
(horizontal and vertical agreements); (3) organs of power and admin-
istration; and (4) merging entities. 53
1. Regulation of Single Entities
Under the contestable theory of markets, a market is functioning
47 Id. art. 2(7). See PITTMAN, supra note 1, at 29.
48 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, arts. 2(6)-(7).
49 Id. art. 2(6) (emphasis added).
50 The Sejm Select Committee has proposed in amendments to the anti-monopoly
statute that the term "monopolist" shall "be used to denote every firm whose share of the
market exceeds 80 percent." War on Monopoly, GAZETA WYBORCZA, June 21, 1991, at 2,
translated in POLIsH NEWS BULLETIN, June 21, 1991.
51 In fact, as of early 1991, nineteen of the Anti-Monopoly Office's thirty-nine deci-
sions have dealt with unequal bargaining power. Grzegorz Cydejko, Anti-Monopoly Office,
WARSAW VOICE, Jan. 20, 1991.
52 It should be noted that the enabling Article of the Polish statute requires that the
Anti-Monopoly Office issue cease and desist orders prohibiting an arrangement in
restraint of competition if it is a "significant restriction of competition .. .and yields no
economic benefits ..." On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 9.
53 The Russian law also regulates creation and liquidation of economic entities. On
Competition, supra note 1, art. 17. However, because no bankruptcy law yet exists in the
USSR, and because the creation and registration of economic actors is regulated by many
other statutes, neither are the subject of discussion here. The law also controls acquisition
of the initial capitalization stock ofjoint-stock companies, and is not discussed here either.
Id. art. 18.
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optimally when only natural, and not artificial,54 barriers to entry op-
erate to exclude new participants. 5 5 Thus, the goal of antitrust legis-
lation should be to eliminate artificial barriers. Both the Russian and
the Polish laws clearly prohibit such behavior. 56
The Russian law limits actions of single entities occupying domi-
nant market position.57 It lists as limited any arrangement, such as
restricting supplies, to increase prices or the inclusion of uncon-
scionable contract terms in agreements with suppliers or distribu-
tors. It also prohibits "encroachment upon the interests of other
economic actors" as well as the "withdrawal of goods from circula-
tion with the goal of creating or supporting a shortage on the mar-
ket, or increasing prices." 5 8
In 1992, a series of Presidential Decrees were enacted which led
to the creation of a state Registry of Industrial Amalgamations and
Monopoly Manufacturers (the "Registry"). 59 As a result of these de-
crees, enterprises appearing on the Registry may not increase prices
or change the assortment of goods produced without prior govern-
ment approval60 and must pay a large tax on excess profits. 6 1 The
Anti-Monopoly Committee may deny certain government privileges,
such as suspending export licenses, for firms which do not comply
with the restrictions. 62 As of mid-1992, approximately seven percent
of all Russian enterprises 63 were placed in the Registry. 64 The Reg-
istry marks a potentially dangerous setback for the reform effort, in
54 Artificial barriers include (private) collusive activity and (public) regulatory
restrictions.
55 KROLL, supra note 5, at 20-22.
56 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 5. On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, arts. 4, 5.
57 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 5.
58 Id.
59 On Measures to Stabilize the Activity of Russian Industry in 1992, RF Government Decree
No. 165, Feb. 20, 1992, reported in A Useless and Harmiul Decree, MosKovsKY KoMSOMOLETS,
1992 (No. 39), at 3, translated in SovDATA DIALINE - BIzEKoN NEWS, Feb. 27, 1992; Decree
On Stabilizing Enterprise Performance, RF Government Decree No. 165, Feb. 20, 1992, re-
printed in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Feb. 26, 1992, at 1, translated in FBIS-SOV, Feb. 27, 1992,
at 41; On Temporary Measures for Special Regulation of Business Activity of Monopoly Enterprises in
1992, RF Government Decree No. 132, Feb. 27, 1992, translated in SovDATA DIALINE -
SoVLEGISLINE, Feb. 27, 1992; On State Regulation of Prices and Tariffs on Products and Services
of Monopolist Enterprises in 1992-93, reported in Sergei Viktorov, Government Issues Useful Tips
for Monopolies, KOMMERSANr, 1992 (No. 33), at 18, translated in SovDATA DIALINE - BizEKON
NEWS, Aug. 17, 1992.
60 Ye. Shestakov, How to Defeat Monopolies, Nedelya (No. 11), at 6 (1992), translated in
SOvDATA DIALINE - BIzEKoN NEWS, Mar. 20, 1992 [hereinafter Shestakov].
61 V. Belikov, A "Black List" of Monopolists Has Been Compiled in Moscow, IZVESTIlA (No.
36), at 2 (1992), translated in SovDATA DIALINE - BizEKON NEWS, Feb. 12, 1992.
62 David Ljunggen, Russia to Impose Strict Anti-Monopoly Measures, Reuters, Feb. 20,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
63 Approximately 2,000 national and tens of thousands of local enterprises have been
entered in the Registry. Andrei Borodenkov, Monopoly or Life, Moscow NEWS (No. 34)
Aug. 19, 1992 (interview with Leonid Bochi).
64 Shestakov, supra note 60, at 6.
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that it reintroduces state determination of prices by creating ceiling
limitations on natural supply and demand movements. 65
The Polish law is structured much differently. Article 4 lists cer-
tain prohibited "monopolistic practices," such as "forcing onerous
contract terms," "acquiring shares or stocks of companies.., when
such acquisition could lead to a significant weakening of competi-
tion," and "having the same person combine functions of director
* . .in competing economic subjects when at least one of such sub-
jects controls 10% of the market." Yet, an economic entity need not
occupy a dominant market position to violate this article; the
prohibitions apply to all agreements and arrangements. 66 Articles 5
and 7 also outlaw actions by individual firms occupying, respectively,
dominant and monopolist market positions. Enterprises in a domi-
nant position are prohibited from refusing to sell or refusing to
purchase commodities in a manner which discriminates when there
are no alternative supply sources. Similarly prohibited are actions
considered dishonest such as selling below cost. Article 7 prohibits
the limitation of production in order to increase prices or asking un-
reasonably high prices.
The Russian anti-monopoly law is more coherent than the Po-
lish anti-monopoly law for two reasons. First, the Russian law clearly
delineates between individual anti-competitive behavior and agree-
ments between actors, thus avoiding the conceptual and economic
problems of having the same language govern both. Second, the
scope of the Polish law extends to actors who do not necessarily oc-
cupy a large position of the market. Article 4 applies to all actors and
Article 5 can apply to any actor if the Anti-Monopoly Office makes a
determination that they occupy a dominant market position.67
2. Groups Acting in Concert
There are two types of economic arrangements that result in ar-
tificially high profits for an economic entity: horizontal arrange-
ments and vertical arrangements. A horizontal arrangement involves
two actors who operate at the same level of production or distribu-
tion for a given commodity. For example, two automobile distribu-
65 According to the newly appointed chair of the Anti-Monopoly Committee, Leonid
Bochi, the list of enterprises was created pursuant to surveys. "[P]ractically all of them
[the surveys] pointed to one and the same enterprises." Andrei Borodenkov, Monopoly or
Life, Moscow NEWS, Aug. 19, 1992 (interview with Leonid Bochi).
66 Article 4 has recently been applied to correct for unequal bargaining power in the
desperate housing sector. Such regulation, even though correcting a seemingly unjust
situation, has the effect of discouraging business from entering lucrative markets in need
of investment. See Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 29.
67 Recall that the Russian Anti-monopoly Committee may not classify enterprises
with less than 35% market share to be in dominant position. On Competition, supra note
1, art. 4. Further, the Russian administration may not narrow market delineation in order
to inflate the relative market share. Id.
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tors are considered to occupy the same rung on the production-to-
sale ladder, whereas an automobile assembler and a distributer is an
example of a vertical arrangement.
Both arrangements help the organizations involved by increas-
ing their profit margins, but each does so in fundamentally different
ways. A horizontal arrangement hurts competition because collusive
actors can take advantage of their market dominance to raise prices
on a captive set of consumers. A vertical arrangement may hurt com-
petition by forcing onerous terms, or it may improve the quality of a
commodity or service by providing a producer more control over
what actually reaches the consumer. It is important that anti-monop-
oly laws clearly delineate between these two types of behavior be-
cause they present theoretically distinct problems. Since it directly
affects prices, the horizontal relationship is potentially more detri-
mental to competition; therefore, it should be more vigorously pur-
sued.6 8 Both types of behavior are regulated by these laws. 69
a. Horizontal control
Control of horizontal agreements is the most important aspect
of antitrust legislation because these relationships are more likely to
harm competition directly. 70 Both the Russian and the Polish laws
forbid collusive pricing and the division of markets. 7' The Russian
law does not enumerate that agreements to restrict production or
other types of expressly forbidden activities by single actors are per se
prohibited when done by agreement. It will probably be controlled,
however, by the catch-all phrase.72 The Polish law, however, does
specifically prohibit arrangements designed to restrict production
and increase prices. 73
b. Vertical control
Both the Russian and the Polish laws control arrangements be-
tween firms in dominant market positions and their suppliers or dis-
tributors which restrain competition.74 The difference between the
vertical and horizontal arrangement, however, is not clearly outlined
68 PITrMAN, supra note 1, at 5; ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS I.x.c.27 (1776).
69 See On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, arts. 4, 5, 7. See also PITTMAN, supra note 1, at 4-9.
70 PITTMAN, supra note 1, at 4-9.
71 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6. On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, arts. 4, 5.
72 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6.
73 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, arts. 1(2)(3) & 5(4). The Polish
law has separate provisions for economic subjects in "monopolistic position," who by defi-
nition cannot enter into horizontal arrangements. Thus Article 7 is inapplicable here.
74 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, arts. 4-5.
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in the Polish law.7 5 Special emphasis is placed on contract terms
which would otherwise not be part of the bargain had one party not
been in the dominant market position. 76 Tie-in arrangements and
other methods could be seen as unfair exercises of power by those
who are in dominant position, although they are not necessarily
harmful. 77 The biggest shortcoming may be catch-all phrases with
respect to vertical arrangements present in both laws. 78 Because
vertical arrangements are not as inherently dangerous, rigorous reg-
ulation of them often may do more to distort the economy than to
correct it. 7 9
3. Organs of Power and Administration
As discussed previously, only the Russian law regulates the pow-
ers of governmental actors.80 It prohibits8' organs of power and ad-
ministration from restricting competition purposely by limiting the
rights of economic actors to acquire and to sell commodities by es-
tablishing bans on the sale of goods from one region of Russia to
another, by limiting the establishment of new economic actors, and
by unequally taxing different organizations,82 The provisions of the
Russian law take into account the indirect effect of taxation on orga-
nizational behavior, prohibit intra-republican goods transfer, and
limit restrictions on new economic entities. It is important in the
analysis of this law to realize that the government of a dismantling
command economy can wield important influence affecting competi-
tion. The most significant upshot of these provisions is that they al-
low regulation of both a state-owned economic entity and its
controlling ministry (organ of power and administration), before the
state entity is privatized. Thus, sovereign immunity is a less signifi-
cant barrier to the implementation of competitive market reform.8 3
4. Merging Entities
The Russian law also regulates amalgamations and affiliations of
economic actors.8 4 The statute empowers the Committee to monitor
amalgamations and affiliations and requires that all such mergers in
75 PrrrMAN, supra note 1, at 8, 19.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 16-19.
78 Id.; On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, arts. 4, 5.
79 PrrrMAN, supra note 1, at 5-6; Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 18.
80 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 7.
81 Id. This article contains three sections which also exempt actions of organs of
power and administration if they are acting under legislative authority. They are not con-
sidered in this paper.
82 Id.
83 This proviso also raises interesting separation of powers questions, not addressed
in this paper.
84 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
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management or action, or in their entirety, be approved by the Anti-
Monopoly Committee.8 5 All economic actors must submit an appli-
cation to the Anti-Monopoly Committee which has thirty days to
render a decision on the affiliation or amalgamation.8 6 The Anti-
Monopoly Committee has the right to disapprove any merger if the
resulting enterprise would "lead to dominant market position and
(or) actual limitation of competition."'87 Information concerning the
amalgamation or affiliation must be forwarded to the local office of
the Anti-Monopoly Committee which must respond within thirty
days.88 Any "amalgamation or affiliation of economic actors carried
out in violation of the requirements of this article is invalid."8 9
On this level, the Polish law is much broader in scope. It re-
quires that any "intention to merge and transform economic subjects
is amenable to notification of the Anti-Monopoly Office... when the
subject could gain a dominant position on the market or when one of
the parties establishing a new economic subject is in such a posi-
tion." 90 A transformation is considered to include any "new eco-
nomic subject." 9 1 Thus, unlike the Russian law, any change or
division of an existing economic subject or establishment of a new
enterprise is subject to review.92
5. Other Powers
The Russian statute contains one provision unlike any in the Po-
lish statute. Article 10 of the Russian law outlaws certain forms of
unfair competition. It states that the spreading of false information,
false advertising and infringing upon trademarks constitute unfair
85 Id. art. 17(2).
86 Id.
87 Id. art. 17(3).
88 Id. art. 17(2). Article 20 of the Russian law indicates that if the Anti-Monopoly
Committee fails to render a decision within forty-five days from the time of filing of an
application, the applicant has the right to petition any competent Provincial or District
People's court or Provincial State Arbitration Panel in the manner described article 20.
The Russian Anti-Monopoly Committee operates via a network of local and regional and
local boards, which are now in the process of being established. S. Nikitin, For Businessmen
of Russia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (No. 227-228), at 7 (1991), translated in SovDATA DIALINE -
BIzEKoN NEWS, Oct. 31, 1991. For a general discussion of the potential effectiveness of
merger control in Russia, see KROLL, supra note 5, at 38-46, 69-70.
The Polish Anti-Monopoly Office has also established a network of regional offices to
smooth local privatization projects. These offices are located in Warsaw, Gdansk, Cracow,
Lublin, Lodz and Poznan. Anti-Monopoly Office and Privatization, BUSINESS NEWS FROM PO-
LAND, Mar. 8, 1991.
89 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 17(6).
90 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 11(1).
91 Id.
92 The Anti-Monopoly Office has devised a form of detailed questions concerning
state enterprises applying for privatization through the Ministry of Ownership Transfor-
mation. The information is supposed to help the Anti-Monopoly Office ascertain whether
it is possible to break up the enterprise. Anti-Monopoly Office and Privatization, BuSINESS
NEWS FROM POLAND, Mar. 8, 1991.
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competition. Why this provision appears in an antitrust statute is un-
clear, yet the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Russia has the power to
enforce any and all of the law's provisions.93 The Russian Anti-Mo-
nopoly Committee also plays a significant part in coordinating other
aspects of the Russian reform process. For example, the Anti-Mo-
nopoly Committee approves privatization plans94 and monitors the
observance of the recent consumer protection laws.95
C. Exemptions
1. Intellectual Property
Both the Russian and the Polish statutes state that their provi-
sions do not apply to relations extending from the protection of "in-
ventions, industrial prototypes, trademarks and copyrights. .. 96 or
"inventions, trademarks, decorative patterns [and] the regulations of
the Copyright Law." '97 The Russian law suspends this exception
when possessors of such rights use them to "restrict competition. ' 98
The Polish law affirmatively states that license contracts are subject
to the law's regulation.
These exemptions are problematic in that each of these rights
exists to create exclusive intellectual property rights. An inventor
should hold out for the highest price in order to reward himself or
herself for the invention. The anti-monopoly boards could issue or-
ders, and thus fines, for holders of such rights to stop restricting
competition, but at the same time would effectively thwart the value
of such intellectual properties. The ultimate effect of these provi-
sions can only be determined by actual implementation of these laws.
2. Labor Contracts
The Polish law provides a further exception for labor contracts
"concluded by employees and trade unions with their employers for
the purpose of safeguarding the employees' rights." 99 It is possible
that the Russian law does regulate labor relations because its defini-
tion of "commodity" includes work and services.100 However, given
the intrinsic strength of labor in Russia, it is hard to imagine that
93 On Competition, supra note 1, arts. 22-26.
94 State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federa-
tion for 1992, Vedomosti RSFSR, June 11, 1992, reported in Russian State Privatization Pro-
gram, Rossiykaya Gazeta, July 9, 1992, translated in BBC-SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
July 24, 1992, at SU/W0240/C2/1.
95 On the Protection of Consumers' Rights, Vedomosti RSFSR, Feb. 7, 1992; Sergei
Viktorov, Russia Passes a Law Outstripping the Times, KOMMERSANT, (No. 6), at 23, 1992, trans-
lated in SOvDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Feb. 10, 1992.
96 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 2(2).
97 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 3.
98 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 2(2).
99 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 3.
100 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 4.
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collective bargaining arrangements would be subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
3. General Exemptions for Abuse of Dominant Market Position
Both the Russian and Polish laws allow the anti-monopoly
boards to exempt economic actors who prove that their activities are
economically beneficial.' 0 ' The Russian law provides that entities
who maintain a dominant market position or engage in monopolistic
practices are exempt if they can "prove" that their agreements or
mergers: "(1) have facilitated or will facilitate a saturation of the
commodities market, (2) [improve]' the commodities' consumer qual-
ities, or (3) increase ... their competitiveness, in particular on the
foreign market."' 0 2 These exemptions are potentially very broad,103
as an economic actor may argue that dominant market position is
necessary to amass profits or to produce money for research and de-
velopment to improve the quality of consumer goods or to make dis-
tribution more efficient. Many international competitiveness
pretexts are available.
In any event, the scope of these loopholes will primarily be de-
termined by the actual implementation of the law, which may in turn
depend upon the Anti-Monopoly Committee's political support.
Given that much emphasis is likely to be focused on high prices in
the initial stages of the transition to the free market,' 0 4 and observ-
ing that the law places the burden of proof on the economic actor to
show that an exemption applies,' 0 5 it seems that this general exemp-
tion is unlikely to be invoked widely.
The Polish law provides for a different type of exemption. A
"monopolistic practice"' 1 6 or an otherwise prohibited abuse of
"dominant market position"' 0 7 is excused if it is "(1) necessary to
conduct an economic activity and (2) [does] not induce a substantial
101 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6(3). On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, art. 6.
102 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 6(3).
103 Michael Murphy, The Russian Anti-Monopoly Law, S.E.E.J., Sept. 1991, at 9. They
parallel the E.C.'s "rule of reason" exemption to many collusive situations, such as price
fixing. See Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 12-15. United States law takes a much more
absolute stance on certain economic arrangement, such as price fixing. KROLL, supra note
5, at 30. Yet, prior versions of the law exempted entire industrial sectors, such as telecom-
munications, electric power and construction, to which this law applies. KROLL, supra note
5, at 28-30; PrrrMAN, supra note 1, at 10-11.
104 M. Zakharov, Russia's MPs Speak Out, VODNY TRANSPORT (No. 124), at 2 (1991),
translated in SoVDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Oct. 31, 1991; Tatyana Akkuratova, Statisti-
cians Confirm Fears About Russian Economy, TASS, Oct. 25, 1991; What Awaits Us From Now
Until Year's End, IZVESTIIA, July 24, 1991, at 2, translated in 43 CURRENr DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRESS 11 (1991); Jan Winiecki, The Inevitability of a Fall in Output in the Early Stages of
Transition to the Market: Theoretical Underpinnings, 43 SOVIET STUD. 669 (1991).
105 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 5.
106 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art 4.
107 Id. art. 5.
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limitation on competition."'' 08 Although improving international
competitiveness is not mentioned, an entity subject to regulation
could argue that an activity would not take place in the home market
if not produced there. In any event, the international trade exemp-
tion in the Russian law is much broader. 0 9 Since there is a general
desire in all transitional economies to protect "fledgling" domestic
industry that has not had the time to restructure and be competitive
with foreign imports, the Polish law is stronger than the Russian law
in providing only a limited exception." I0 Further, the Polish law
seems more effective in that it provides no general exception for an
entity in "monopolistic market position."'
D. Scope of Remedies 112
Antitrust laws have two basic goals: protecting the consumer
and protecting competition." 3 The former may be a derivative of
the latter, yet the difference is still important in many situations. The
tell-tale sign of a difference in approach is the selection of remedies.
Price controls are more often associated with consumer
protection. 114
1. Price Controls
Controlling prices is not considered to be the best way of restor-
108 Id. art. 6. The language of Article 9 indicates that such exemption is at the discre-
tion of the Anti-Monopoly Office.
109 This is logical given Poland's emphasis on reducing import barriers to spur compe-
tition among local producers. Competition Rather Than Tariff Interview with Anna Fornalczyk,
Head of Anti-Monopoly Office, POLIsH NEws BULLETIN, Dec. 17, 1991; Sachs & Lipton, supra
note 21, at 54. But see Iwona Ryniewicz, Consumers Will Pay, PoLIsH NEws BULLETIN, Aug.
16, 1991; Proposed Arrangements for Car Import Quota with Western Motor Companies, BBC -
SUMMARY OF WORLD EVENTS, Jan. 30, 1992, at EE/W0215/A/l.
110 Competition Rather Than Tariff. Interview with Anna Fornalczyk, Head of Anti-Monopoly
Office, POLIsH NEws BULLETIN, Dec. 17, 1991. See generally Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at
9-10, 30; Sachs & Lipton, supra note 21, at 60, 63-64.
111 See On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, arts. 6-7.
112 Each law contains an appellate process. The Russian law provides that decisions
rendered by or fines imposed by the Anti-Monopoly Committee are appealable to the
Russian Supreme Court, the Higher Court of Arbitration, Provincial or District People's
court or Provincial State Arbitration Panel by economic actors or bodies of power and
administration. On Competition, supra note 1, art. 28. The Polish law provides that
appeals may be made only to the Voivodship Court in Warsaw (Anti-Monopoly Court). On
Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 10(l).
The Polish law allows a private actor to petition the Anti-Monopoly Office to institute
a proceeding. Id. art. 21(2). No parallel provision exists in the Russian text.
113 The laws allow price controls, but may still be more geared toward the protection
of competition. On Competition, supra note 1, art. 1; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices,
supra note 1, arts. 9, 12. Michael Murphy, The Russian Anti-Monopoly Law, S.E.E.J., Sept.
1991, at 11. Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 352-55.
114 PITTMAN, supra note 1, at 31-32. The laws also empower the anti-monopoly boards
to levy fines. On Competition, supra note 1, arts. 22, 23(1); On Counteracting Monopolistic
Practices, supra note 1, arts. 15, 16. The Russian law allows forcible disgorgement of prof-
its. On Competition, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
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ing vigorous competition because the government is not the ideal
agent to determine the "correct" market price. Such reasoning
could lead the government onto the slippery slope leading back to
the command economy and re-centralized pricing.", 5 Both laws are
lacking in this respect.
The Russian law empowers the Anti-Monopoly Committee to is-
sue orders to cease and desist violations." 16 When an actor or actors
engage in an activity which artificially raises prices or restricts supply,
the anti-monopoly boards have the power to order lower prices or to
order that production be increased or goods be distributed to ob-
structed areas. The creation of the Registry of Industrial Amalgama-
tions and Monopoly Manufacturers is the first manifestation of this
power to control prices.' '7 The introduction of the Registry and the
subsequent price controls indicate a willingness on the part of the
Russian Anti-Monopoly Committee to regulate prices." 18
The Polish law more explicitly allows for price controls,"19
although it also has the power to issue cease and desist orders.' 20
Thus, the provisions of both laws, the Polish law in particular, are
potentially counterproductive.' 2 ' The Polish law also allows for reg-
ulation of commodities dumping by prohibiting "dishonest actions"
including "selling below costs of production in order to eliminate
115 See Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 356, 366-67; PrrTMAN, supra note 1, at 31-
32; Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 20-24.
116 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
117 See discussion in Part II.B.I.
118 A Useless and Harmful Decree, MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS (No. 39), at 3 (1992), trans-
lated in SovDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Feb. 27, 1992.
119 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 8(3); Fox & Ordover, supra
note 17, at 21.
120 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
.121 Two examples are noteworthy. FSO, Poland's only mid-size car manufacturer,
raised the prices for their FSO-1500 model two times in the first half of 1990. On October
8, 1990 the Anti-Monopoly Office required the enterprise to lower the price. BUSINESS
NEWS FROM POLAND, Oct. 12, 1990. Facing bankruptcy and the potential lay-off of 25,000
workers, the management decided that they would not adhere to the order. Leszek
Imijewski, FSO Under Pressure; Monopoly on Junk, WARSAW VOICE, Oct. 21, 1990. An appeal
to the Anti-Monopoly Court was successful on December 18. Gazeta Wyborcza, Dec. 19,
1990, at 1, translated in POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Dec. 19, 1990. The court based its decision
in part on the fact that the material input costs had risen dramatically through the year.
Grzegorz Cydejko, Anti-Monopoly Office, WARSAW VOICE, Jan. 20, 1991. The case is cur-
rently on appeal to the Polish Supreme Court. Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 382.
This drama is important because it shows the potential abuse of the ability to control
prices and because it highlights the utility of a timely appellate process.
More recently, Agricultural Minster Gabrial Janowski declared that the Anti-Monop-
oly Office would take a more active role in determining farm prices. BBC - SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS,Jan. 6, 1992, at EE/1270/B/1. Specifically, seventeen decisions have
been issued to divide local grain processing enterprises; two of the seventeen have been
carried out. Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 383.
Anna Fornalczyk, head of the Anti-Monopoly Office, has stated that she views price
controls as a method of last resort. Grzegorz Gorny, Interview with Anna Fornalczyk, President
of the Anti-Monopoly Office; We Are Learning Our Alphabet, GAZETA Irr'L, June 28, 1990. Per-
haps these instances are isolated.
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competitors."122 Dumping in the domestic market context is consid-
ered to succeed very rarely in excluding competition.12 3 Only when
extremely high barriers to entry prohibit firms from entering a mar-
ket would underselling goods impede competition. In this situation,
the activity which caused the high barriers in the first place would
already be governed by Article 5(1). Thus, it seems this section of
the Polish statute serves the protectionist agenda better than the
goal of competition. 2 4
2. "Trust-busting"
An effective anti-monopoly law should include the ability to
physically divide enterprises. 12 5 Both laws get high marks on this
account. The Russian law provides that entities may be forcibly di-
vided into separate organizations. 126 Such a solution may be carried
out in not less than six months' 2 7 when: (1) the production, struc-
tural subdivisions or structural units can be territorially isolated; (2)
there is no technological interdependence of production; and (3)
spheres of production of specialized goods may be differentiated.' 2 8
The Polish law similarly provides that "state enterprises, coop-
eratives and companies of commercial law having a dominant posi-
tion on the market can be divided or liquidated, when they
permanently limit competition or conditions of their existence [read,
create market barriers]."'12 9 Two aspects of this provision stand out.
First, only a few types of economic subjects, as defined in Article 2,
are subject to this provision. Second, the entities must actually have
dominant or monopolistic market position. Thus, this remedy is not
available to many of the activities and enterprises subject to Article 4.
This limitation is appropriate for the reasons cited previously, that
the Polish law threatens overbreadth in the types of arrangements
that it regulates.' 3 0
The Polish Anti-Monopoly Office has implemented its powers to
break apart enterprises. After investigating local grain producers
who held a monopoly for their services in their respective markets,
the Office issued seventeen decisions to divide the enterprises. Two
of the seventeen have been carried out.' 3 ' In general, the Polish
122 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 5(5).
123 Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 25.
124 But see Sachs and Lipton, supra note 20, at 54.
125 Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 374; Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 6-7.
126 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 19.
127 Id. art. 19(3).
128 Id. art. 19(2). See Gennadi Filshin, On Prospects For Pulling Russia Out of Crisis, FED-
ERAL NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 4, 1991.
129 On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
130 But see Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 34-35.
131 Langenfeld & Blitzer, supra note 4, at 383.
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Anti-Monopoly Office has been quite active.' 32 Although some have
argued that the ability to break up firms is moot due to the degree of
industrial concentration, 133 this power is important because domi-
nant actors can be forced into a position of competition, and not
regulated into acting as if they were in competition. 34
3. Other Powers of the Anti-Monopoly Boards
Both anti-monopoly boards are also charged with recom-
mending legislation for the effective functioning of competitive mar-
kets. 3 5 This authority is logical given that the boards have access to
an array of information concerning economic actors.' 3 6 Russia has
already passed consumer protection legislation, and will continue to
help guide the transition to a free market.' 37 The Polish Anti-Mo-
nopoly Office has proposed many regulations including a pro forma
notification request for enterprise restructuring. This form helps
clarify exactly what is needed to begin the privatization process.' 38
III. Conclusions
Both the Russian Law on Competition and the Polish Law on
Counteracting Monopolistic Practices could effectively enforce the
conditions necessary for a healthy competitive market. Although
each law makes progress towards forwarding the privatization move-
ment, there are potential weaknesses to both laws, which may hinder
the development of the free market reforms. Chiefly, these are:
1. Control of organs of power and administration is an effec-
tive weapon against political circumvention, assuming the Anti-Mo-
nopoly Committee acts independently. The inability of the Polish
Anti-Monopoly Office to regulate this area of activity may prove to
its detriment;
2. The definition of "market" in which "market share" is to be
measured is fairly clear in the Russian law, and left unspecified by the
Polish law. Such omission creates the possibility for "market share
inflation" and, thus, overregulation;
3. The Polish law regulates "monopolistic practices" of all eco-
132 Id. at 380-84.
133 KROLL, supra note 5, at 24-25; Hare & Hughes, supra note 25, at 40-41.
134 Fox & Ordover, supra note 17, at 31-41.
135 On Competition, supra note 1, arts: 11 (2), 16; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices,
supra note 1, art. 19(6).
136 On Competition, supra note 1, art. 13; On Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, supra
note 1, art. 20.
137 Law on the Protection of Consumers' Rights, Vedomosti RSFSR, Feb. 7, 1992; D.
Urazhtsev, Buyers Will Receive the Rights. Someday They 'l Receive the Goods Too, KOMMERSANT,
1991, at 2, translated in SovDATA DIALINE - BIzEKON NEWS, Dec. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires file.
138 Anti-Monopoly Office and Privatization, BUSINESS NEWS FROM POLAND, Mar. 8, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNP file.
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nomic subjects, even those which may not occupy a substantial mar-
ket position, perhaps allowing detrimental overbreadth in coverage;
4. The Polish law does not clearly distinguish between rules
governing individual behavior and those controlling agreements
among economic actors. This weakness is not as important by
comparison;
5. Only the Russian law differentiates between vertical and
horizontal arrangements;
6. Both also have fairly large loopholes that give the anti-mo-
nopoly boards the power to grant broad exemptions;
7. The laws do permit price controls, and may be serious about
it, since much emphasis is now placed on the legislation's ability to
control inflation. Poland's limited experience attests to this possibil-
ity. Russia has expressed a willingness to use this power actively;
8. . The Polish law contains the odd proviso limiting the resale
of goods below cost. This may serve protectionist goals better than
competition policy; and
9. Both laws are effective in that they allow the anti-monopoly
boards to "trust-bust," to break up dominant firms if necessary.
No reasoned final judgment can be rendered until the relatively new
laws gain some experience in implementation.13 9 Only time will tell.
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Recent reshuffling at the Russian Anti-Monopoly Committee indicates that enforce-
ment of the Law On Competition will be more vigorously enforced. Viktor Melnikov, New
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